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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Keith D. Boyette, Robert T. Billingsley, Randal M. Reaves
and Paul A. Simpson*
This survey covers judicial and legislative developments in Vir-
ginia employment law between June 1988 and June 1989. The sur-
vey does not address judicial and legislative developments in the
areas of workers' compensation or unemployment compensation.
During the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court of
Virginia unequivocally recognized a cause of action against em-
ployers for their negligent hiring, retention or supervision of em-
ployees and removed a significant defense available to former em-
ployees resisting enforcement of a non-competition covenant. The
state and federal courts continued to reaffirm the vitality of the at-
will employment presumption, addressed the parameters of the
public policy exception to that presumption and clarified the sta-
tus of oral "just cause" employment contracts under the statute of
frauds. Legislative developments during this period were relatively
sparse. The General Assembly limited the ability of employers to
discharge employees for absence due to a work-related injury and
adopted civil penalties for an employer's failure to comply with
statutes governing the medium and time of payment of wages.
I. NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION OR SUPERVISION
In J. V. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church,' the Supreme
Court of Virginia recognized the tort of negligent hiring. This
cause of action has been increasingly employed in other jurisdic-
tions in recent years and its recognition by the supreme court will
have immediate and far-reaching impact on the hiring and supervi-
* Mr. Boyette is a principal and Messrs. Billingsley, Reaves and Simpson are associates
with Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. Mr. Boyette
received his B.A. from George Washington University in 1975 and his J.D. from Washington
& Lee University in 1978. Mr. Billingsley received his A.B. from the College of William &
Mary in 1976 and his J.D. from the University of Richmond in 1980. Mr. Reaves received
his B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1980 and his J.D. from the University of Virginia
in 1985. Mr. Simpson received his B.A. from Washington & Lee University in 1976 and his
J.D. from Wake Forest University in 1987.
1. 236 Va. 206, 372 S.E.2d 391 (1988).
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sion policies and practices of Virginia employers.2 Under this doc-
trine and the closely related theory of negligent retention and su-
pervision, tort liability is imposed on employers under certain
circumstances for the intentional and/or criminal acts of their em-
ployees, as well as for the employees' negligence. These theories
broaden the scope of employers' liability for the acts of their em-
ployees by allowing compensation to a plaintiff when respondeat
superior, the traditional basis for employer liability to third par-
ties, does not apply. Specifically, the theories of negligent hiring,
retention and supervision enable plaintiffs to recover in situations
where respondeat superior's "scope of employment" limitation
previously protected employers from liability. Moreover, causes of
action under these theories allow for the imposition of punitive
damages against an employer under appropriate facts.'
Under the traditional doctrine of respondeat superior, an em-
ployer is liable for the negligent, willful or intentional act of his
employee only if, at the time of the act, the employee was perform-
ing his employer's business and acting within the scope of his em-
ployment.4 Generally, an act is within the scope of employment if:
(1) it was expressly or impliedly directed by the employer, or is
naturally incident to the business, and (2) it was performed, al-
though mistakenly or ill-advisedly, with the intent to further the
employer's interest, or from some impulse or emotion that was the
natural consequence of an attempt to do the employer's business.
Such an act may not arise wholly from some external, independent
and personal motive on the part of the employee to do the act
upon his own account.5 Thus, if the act causing the injury to a
third party is done while the employee is acting on his own behalf
rather than for the employer, the employer is not liable to the
third party under the respondeat superior doctrine. Moreover, the
employer is not liable under respondeat superior for an act com-
2. Id. at 209, 372 S.E.2d at 393.
3. Punitive damages may be awarded for gross negligence in hiring or retaining an unfit
employee who causes injury to a third party. See, e.g., Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578
S.W.2d 173, 182-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); King v. McGuff, 149 Tex. 432, 434-35, 234 S.W.2d
403, 405 (1950).
4. Kensington Assocs. v. West, 234 Va. 430, 432, 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987); Davis v.
Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 77-79, 112 S.E. 628, 629-31 (1922).
5. 234 Va. at 432, 362 S.E.2d at 901.
6. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Robertson, 142 Va. 454, 476-77, 129 S.E. 224, 227-
28 (1925) (employer not liable for negligent act of employee who, while returning from din-
ner, assists the driver of a wagon to raise some wires so the wagon may pass beneath them);
Drake v. Norfolk Steam Laundry Corp., 135 Va. 354, 360-61, 116 S.E. 668, 670 (1923).
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mitted by an employee who has markedly deviated from his em-
ployer's business.7
In contrast, under the doctrines of negligent hiring, retention
and supervision, an employer may be held liable for the acts of his
employee, whether or not the employee is acting within the scope
of employment, if the employer is negligent in hiring or retaining
an employee who is either incompetent or unfit.' Such negligence
usually consists of hiring, supervising, retaining or assigning the
employee with the knowledge of his unfitness, or failing to use rea-
sonable care to discover the unfitness. The liability of the employer
to a third person based on negligent hiring or retention is entirely
independent of the liability of the employer under the doctrine of
respondeat superior9
In Victory Tabernacle, the plaintiff alleged that her ten year-old
daughter had been repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted by an
employee of the defendant church. Plaintiff also alleged that when
the church hired the employee, the defendant knew or should have
known that the employee recently had been convicted of aggra-
vated sexual assault on a young girl, that he was on probation for
this offense, and that a condition of his probation was that he not
be involved with children. Plaintiff further alleged that, despite
the foregoing facts, the employee was hired and given duties that
encouraged him to come freely into contact with children, and that
he was giyen keys that enabled him to lock and unlock all of the
church's doors. 10 Based on these allegations, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a cause of action for negligent hiring was
stated."
In reaching its decision in Victory Tabernacle, the court held
that the tort of negligent hiring exists in Virginia, independent of
the doctrine of respondeat superior.'2 The court stated that:
7. See, e.g., Broaddus v. Standard Drug Co., 211 Va. 645, 654, 179 S.E.2d 497, 504 (1971)
(traffic guard, assigned to store's parking lot, was held to have temporarily departed and
deviated from his employer's business when he shot the plaintiff, who was involved in an
altercation with a police officer assigned to "shoplifting detail."). Taylor v. Robertson Chev-
rolet Co., 177 Va. 289, 295, 13 S.E.2d 326, 329 (1941).
8. See generally 35 Am. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 422 (1970) (discussing "ownership
of instrumentality" and accident).
9. See id.
10. 236 Va. at 207, 372 S.E.2d at 392.
11. Id. at 211, 372 S.E.2d at 394.
12. Id. at 209, 372 S.E.2d at 394.
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[N]egligent hiring is a doctrine of primary liability; the employer is
principally liable for negligently placing an unfit person in an em-
ployment situation involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
Negligent hiring, therefore, enables plaintiffs to recover in situations
where respondeat superior's 'scope of employment' limitation previ-
ously protected employers from liability."3
Although the court did not directly address the issue of em-
ployer liability to a third party for negligent retention or supervi-
sion of an employee in Victory Tabernacle, it is likely that the
court will recognize such liability. The two torts are closely related.
In fact, some courts identify the two as a single tort for "negligent
hiring or retention." Moreover, the charitable hospital cases cited
by the court in Victory Tabernacle spoke in terms of liability for
"negligent selection and retention" of unfit employees, thus sup-
porting the existence of the tort of negligent retention or supervi-
sion in Virginia. 1
4
Unfortunately for Virginia employers, the Victory Tabernacle
court did not address the parameters of the negligent hiring cause
of action. As a result, one must turn to the case law from other
jurisdictions to scrutinize the possible ramifications of the Victory
Tabernacle holding. In light of the decision, the prudent employer
and counsel will be well-advised to reexamine the employer's hir-
ing and supervision practices to shield against potential liability
based on negligent hiring, retention or supervision.
As with any other negligence cause of action, to be liable for neg-
ligent hiring, retention or supervision, the employer must first owe
a duty of care to the plaintiff. After the duty has been established,
courts in other jurisdictions generally have cited six requisite ele-
ments for the cause of action: (1) an employment relationship must
have existed between the defendant and the tortfeasor; 15 (2) the
13. Id. at 211, 372 S.E.2d at 394 (quoting Note, Minnesota Developments-Employer Lia-
bility for the Criminal Acts of Employees Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v.
K.M.S. Invs., 68 MINN. L. REv. 1303, 1306-07 (1984)).
14. 236 Va. at 208, 372 S.E.2d at 393; see, e.g., Hill v. Leigh Memorial Hosp., Inc., 204 Va.
501, 504-06, 132 S.E.2d 411, 413-15 (1963). These charitable hospital cases establish the
proposition that an exception to the charitable immunity doctrine, which among other
things shields charitable institutions from respondeat superior liability, exists on the
ground of negligent hiring or retention of an unfit employee. 204 Va. at 504-06, 132 S.E.2d
at 413-15.
15. For a discussion of the issues in this area, see generally 12B Michie's Jur. Master and
Servant § 97 (Repl. Vol. 1978) and the cases cited therein. But see Coath v. Jones, 277 Pa.
Super. 479, -, 419 A.2d 1249, 1250-52 (1980) (employer held liable for a rape committed
[Vol. 23:607
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employee must have been unfit under the circumstances of the em-
ployment;' 6 (3) the employer must have known or should have
known through reasonable investigation that the employee was un-
fit;' 7 (4) the employee's tortious act must have been the cause in
fact of the plaintiff's injuries; 8 (5) the negligent hiring, retention
by a fired employee under the rationale that the employment situation required customers
to admit the former employee into their homes and, thus, the employer should have warned
customers of the former employee's violent propensities).
16. Since an employer will be negligent only if his employee poses an unreasonable risk in
a particular employment position, "employee unfitness" is determined by the circumstances
of employment. What makes an employee unfit in one situation does not necessarily consti-
tute unfitness in others. See Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
The list of characteristics or traits that courts have used to establish unfitness include ha-
bitual intoxication, lack of training and skills, physical and mental infirmities, prior "mali-
cious horseplay," and prior criminal convictions. See, e.g., Id. at 678 (physical and mental
infirmities); Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 265 F. Supp. 268 (M.D. Pa.
1967) (lack of training and skills); Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 388
P.2d 824 (1964) (horseplay); Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Or. 621, 87 P.2d 209 (1939) (habitual
intoxication); Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (prior
criminal convictions).
17. Although there are reported decisions that require actual knowledge of the employee's
unfitness before the hiring will constitute negligence, most courts hold that an employer has
a duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry before hiring, and thus negligence may be based on
the employer's constructive knowledge. See, e.g., Hersh v. Kentfield Buildings, Inc., 385
Mich. 410, 412-13, 189 N.W.2d 286, 288-89 (1971). A number of jurisdictions require that an
employee's unfitness must have been ascertainable for the employer's failure to conduct an
investigation to constitute a breach of duty. See, e.g., Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386
So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981) (em-
ployer chargeable with such information concerning employee's background as it could have
been obtained through a reasonable inquiry); Stein v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 102 Ill.
App. 3d 776, 779-80, 430 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1981) (not shown that a more complete investiga-
tion would have enabled employer to determine employee had a propensity for violence);
Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 51, 386 P.2d 910, 911 (1963) (no evidence em-
ployer could have discovered employee's vicious temperament through investigation). How-
ever, at least one court has found that an employer's failure to conduct any pre-employment
investigation is a per se breach of duty, regardless of whether the employee's fitness was
ascertainable. Weiss v. Furniture-In-The-Raw, 62 Misc. 2d 283, 285, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (employer liable for failure to use any standards in hiring temporary
workers for furniture delivery).
In general, the greater contact that the prospective employee is to have with the public or
certain segments of the public, the more stringent the employment screening process should
be. For example, in Williams, where a condominium management company was sued by a
guest of a condominium owner for assault by an employee, the court concluded that while
the company had no obligation to make inquiry of the employee's past as long as he had
only incidental contact with tenants (he was originally employed to do yard maintenance), it
had a duty to make a reasonable inquiry about his background before transferring him three
weeks after employment to an inside job that provided him with the possibility of "intimate
contact" with tenants and access to the condominium passkeys. Williams, 386 So. 2d at
1240.
18. The plaintiff must show that he was injured by the tortious act of the employee. See
Comment, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: The Case Against Exclusion, 52
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or supervision must have been the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries;'" and (6) actual damage or harm must have resulted
from the tortious act.2
0
In Victory Tabernacle, the Supreme Court of Virginia did not
consider the scope of the duty owed by an employer who negli-
gently hires or retains an employee who injures a third party. Most
jurisdictions accepting these theories, however, have held that an
employer's duty to hire competent and "fit" employees extends to
any member of the general public who comes into contact with the
employment situation.21 Thus, courts have found employers liable
for negligent hiring or retention of employees where employers in-
vite the general public onto the business premises,22 or require em-
OR. L. REV. 296, 298-300 (1973).
19. The requisites of proximate cause are "the doing or omitting to do an act which a
person of ordinary prudence could foresee might naturally or probably produce the inquiry"
by such act or omission, and the infliction of the injury by such act or omission. Virginia
Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Kiser, 105 Va. 695, 705, 54 S.E. 889, 892 (1906). In Victory Taber-
nacle, the court stated:
[Tihe very thing that allegedly should have been foreseen in this case is that the
employee would commit a violent act upon a child. To say that a negligently hired
employee who acts willfully or criminally thus relieves his employer of liability for
negligent hiring when willful or criminal conduct is precisely what the employer
should have foreseen would rob the tort of vitality by improperly subjecting it to
factors that bear upon the separate concept of employer liability based on respondeat
superior.
236 Va. at 210, 372 S.E.2d at 394. Moreover, as one court stated in upholding the liability of
an employer for the negligent hiring of an employee who had a long history of having com-
mitted violent crimes:
The negligence in hiring found by the jury was clearly the proximate cause of the
injury .... The negligence in hiring [the employee] was the only reason he was on
the premises, had contact with the tenant . . ., and was provided with a passkey
facilitating his entry into her apartment in order to rape her.
Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 915 (Minn. 1983).
In respondeat superior cases, the existence of an "efficient intervening cause." usually the
wrongful act of the employee outside the scope of his employment, will absolve the employer
of liability. As the foregoing implies, however, once the employer's negligence in hiring, re-
taining or supervising the employee is established and the other requisites of the case of
action are met, the act of the employee cannot be an intervening cause. In fact, the Ponticas
court explicitly held: "[Tihe inherent nature of a negligent hiring cause of action precludes
the application of superseding [sic] intervening cause. By its definition, the factfinder ...
has already determined [that] the injury-causing conduct of the employee was foreseeable."
331 N.W.2d at 915-16.
20. As with any other negligence cause of action, some injury is essential. If there is no
injury, there can be no recovery, whatever may have been the negligence of the defendant.
See Richmond & Danville R.R. Co. v. Moffett, 88 Va. 785, 788, 14 S.E. 370, 371-72 (1892).
21. See, e.g., Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. 1951); Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md.
160, 165-66, 395 A.2d 480, 483-84 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Priest v. F.W. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo. App. 23, 25-26, 62
S.W.2d 926, 927 (1933).
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ployees to visit residences.23
One commentator, in analyzing the requisite connection between
plaintiffs and employment situations in negligent hiring cases, has
stated that three common factors underlie most case law imposing
a duty to third parties: (1) the employee and the plaintiff must
have been in places where each had a right to be when the wrong-
ful act occurred; (2) the plaintiff must have met the employee as a
direct result of the employment; and (3) the employer must have
received some benefit, if only potential or indirect, from the meet-
ing of the employee and the plaintiff.24 However, these factors have
not been uniformly applied and serve as little guide. 5
Generally speaking, an employer does not have a duty to check
for a criminal record in making a reasonable investigation of the
prospective or retained employee unless the employer is put on no-
tice to do S0.26 However, suspicious factors such as short residency
periods, gaps in employment, or admissions of prior criminal con-
victions that are revealed in employment applications or in inter-
views, put the employer on notice.
Where the employer does not know the real nature of the em-
ployee's offense, or where the offense, though known to the em-
ployer, is not tortious in character or is unrelated to the employee's
act, some courts have held the employer is not liable to the injured
third party.28 Moreover, the mere fact that the employee had a
criminal record, even a conviction for a crime of violence, does not
23. See, e.g., Coath v. Jones, 277 Pa. Super 479, -, 419 A.2d 1249, 1250 (1980).
24. Note, The Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of Their Employees: The
Negligent Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717, 724 (1977).
25. See, e.g., Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 337-38, 503 A.2d 1333, 1342
(1986) (suspected vandal was within class of persons subjected to an increased risk of harm
by the negligent assignment of security duties to unfit employee); Coath, 277 Pa. Super. at
-, 419 A.2d at 1250-51 (employer may be held liable for rape committed by a fired em-
ployee in a customer's home).
26. See, e.g., Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 168, 395 A.2d 480, 484-85 (no duty to check
for criminal record if employer has sufficient basis for relying on employee); see also Abra-
ham v. S.E. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 628, 632-33, 446 P.2d 821, 825 (1968); Amendolara v.
Macy's New York, 19 A.D.2d 702, 703, 241 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1963). But see Ponticas v.
K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 915 (Minn. 1983).
27. See generally Shattuck, Negligent Hiring: Are Employers Liable for Employee Mis-
conduct?, 13 ALI-ABA Course Materials Journ. 7, 16 (1988).
28. In Argonne Apartment House Co. v. Garrison, 42 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1930), for exam-
ple, the fact that an employee had been convicted of intoxication was held not to be suffi-
cient of itself to put the employer (apartment house owner) on notice of the dishonesty of
the employee and subject the employer to liability to a tenant for the theft by the employee
of the tenant's jewelry. Id. at 608.
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
by itself establish that the employer would be negligent in hiring
him; instead, it is a factor the jury can consider.29
The Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Victory Tabernacle
underscores the importance of employers and their counsel review-
ing the employer's interviewing and screening procedures utilized
prior to employment, and developing appropriate procedures for
monitoring employee conduct after employment.
II. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Counsel for employers are frequently asked to prepare agree-
ments containing covenants not to compete for execution by indi-
viduals already employed by the employer. In connection with the
preparation of such post-employment non-competition agreements,
a question has existed as to whether the continuation of the em-
ployment relationship after the execution of the agreement consti-
tutes consideration for the agreement or wlhether the employer
must provide some benefit to the employee, such as increased com-
pensation, enhanced position or title, or added job security, to pro-
vide consideration for the post-employment agreement.
In Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector,30 the Supreme
Court of Virginia answered this question, at least with respect to
at-will employment relationships. In 1982, certain employees of
Paramount, including two sales representatives, a service coordina-
tor, a service technician and an insect inspector, were required for
the first time to execute non-competition agreements as a condi-
tion of their continued at-will employment.31 The non-competition
covenant prohibited the employees from engaging in the pest con-
trol business in any of the counties in which they were assigned by
Paramount during a two-year period from and after the date upon
29. Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc., 385 Mich. 410, 415-16, 189 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1971).
Additionally, a policy of refusing employment based on arrest records is unlawful without
evidence that the requirement is necessary to the operation of the employer's business.
Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Such inquiries alone
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the fact that an individual has been
arrested is not conclusive as to any wrongdoing and is irrelevant to work qualifications, and
because the mere inquiry into arrest records tends to have a chilling effect on black appli-
cants. Id. at 402-03. Also, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389(C) (Repl. Vol. 1983) provides that "[nlo
criminal justice agency or person shall confirm the existence or nonexistence of criminal
history record information for employment or licensing inquiries except as provided by
law." Id.
30. 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989).
31. Id. at 172, 175, 380 S.E.2d at 923-24, 926.
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which they ceased, for any reason, to be an employee of
Paramount.32
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that because the non-com-
petition covenant was limited to the counties in which the employ-
ees were assigned by Paramount during their employment, the cov-
enant was not overbroad geographically. 3 The court also held that
it was not necessary for the employees, to whom the covenant was
applicable, to have acquired or possessed specific information,
which was confidential or constituted a trade secret, in order for
the employer to have a legitimate business interest which could be
protected by the covenant. 4 The court stated that the exposure of
the employees to the employer's methods of estimating the cost of
its work, its specifications for doing the work and its techniques of
pest control, as well as the employees' frequent contact with the
employer's customers, constituted legitimate business interests of
the employer entitled to protection.3 5 Thus, the court held that the
covenant was no greater than reasonably necessary to protect the
employer's legitimate business interest.36
The court also observed that the non-competition covenant did
not unreasonably curtail the employees' legitimate efforts to earn a
livelihood because they were not prohibited from engaging in the
employer's business in a number of areas within commuting dis-
tance; furthermore, they could engage in work other than the type
done by the employer's business in the counties where they for-
merly worked. 7 In addition, the court found that the covenant did
not unreasonably restrain trade or violate public policy because the
"pest control business was highly competitive, with a limited sup-
ply of customers, and an ample supply of businesses and personnel
willing to supply such services. '38
Each of the foregoing holdings of Paramount simply applies ex-
32. Id. at 172-73, 380 S.E.2d at 924.
33. Id. at 175, 380 S.E.2d at 925. The Supreme Court of Virginia has previously upheld
non-competition covenants which were coterminous with the territory in which the em-
ployer did business. E.g., Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 553, 290
S.E.2d 882, 884-85 (1982); Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 582-83, 95 S.E.2d 186, 190 (1956).
34. 238 Va. at 175, 380 S.E.2d at 925.
35. Id.
36. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia has previously recognized that an employer has a
legitimate business interest in protecting its customers from former employees who had con-
tact with them. See, e.g., Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. at 582, 95 S.E.2d at 190.
37. 238 Va. at 175, 380 S.E.2d at 925.
38. Id.
1989] 615
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isting Virginia law in this area. However, the court's discussion of
whether continuation of employment constituted consideration for
the non-competition covenant addressed an area not specifically
dealt with previously by the court. In Paramount, the former em-
ployees argued that the non-competition covenant lacked consider-
ation because they were employed when they signed the agree-
ments. 9 The court rejected the former employees' argument and
held that "[e]ven though Paramount could have terminated the
employees at its will after they signed the non-competition agree-
ments, Paramount continued to employ them and to give them ac-
cess to valuable information. This supplied the consideration for
their promise not to compete."4 0
The court's conclusion in. Paramount that continuation of em-
ployment constituted adequate consideration to support a post-
employment non-competition covenant was made in the context of
an at-will employment relationship. The court did not address
whether a post-employment, non-competition covenant entered
into within the context of an employment relationship for a speci-
fied term or terminable only for cause would be supported by ade-
quate consideration if there was no other change in the employ-
ment relationship and the employment continued. 4' Additionally,
the employees in Paramount did not argue that the employer had
acted in bad faith or that the employer's conduct was unconsciona-
39. Id. at 176, 380 S.E.2d at 926. The case law throughout the United States on the issue
raised by the employees is divided. See generally Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration
for Employee's Covenant not to Compete, Entered Into After Inception of Employment, 51
A.L.R.3d 825 (1973). Courts in other jurisdictions have held that continuation of employ-
ment alone will not provide consideration for a post-employment non-competition covenant.
E.g., George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 484-85, 347 A.2d 311, 316, (1975); see
also Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 889 (W. Va. 1979) (purportedly applying Virginia
law).
40. 238 Va. at 176, 380 S.E2d at 926. Such a holding is consistent with the majority of
case law throughout the United States. Annotation, supra note 39. In its opinion in Para-
mount, the court cited two earlier decisions where continued employment was found to pro-
vide consideration for a post-employment contract providing for severance pay, a right
which had previously not been granted to the employees. Dulany Foods, Inc. v. Ayers, 220
Va. 502, 510-11, 260 S.E.2d 196, 201-02 (1979); Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va.
531, 541-42, 53 S.E.2d 804, 808-09 (1949). In each of these cases, the court found that both
parties to the contract received a benefit. The employee received the guarantee of severance
pay and the employer received the continued employment of the employee.
41. Some courts have held that where an employee has a definite term of employment,
the continuation of employment cannot be the sole consideration for a post-employment
non-competition covenant. E.g., Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 162-63, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548-49
(1944); Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 118-21, 28 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1934).
[Vol. 23:607
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ble or resulted in a contract of adhesion. 42
Finally, the Paramount decision applied Roanoke Engineering
Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum" which held that any injunction issued in
the case on remand would extend for a total of two years from the
date of the injunction and not simply two years from the date of
the termination of the employment." The court awarded this rem-
edy despite the fact that the non-competition agreement did not
provide for such relief and despite the fact that the employer did
not specifically request such prospective enforcement in its Bill of
Complaint or in connection with requesting the appeal.45
III. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LITIGATION
In 1987, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Miller v. SEVAMP,
Inc.,46 strongly reaffirmed the continued vitality of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine in Virginia. The court continued this ap-
proach during June 1988 to June 1989.
In Addision v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union,47 the court held that the employer's assurance that the em-
ployee could have a job "as long as he wanted one and as long as
one existed" was insufficient to overcome the presumption of at-
will employment. 48 In so ruling, the court distinguished the em-
ployment contract at issue in Addison from a contract in which an
employee is assured job security so long as his performance is sat-
isfactory.49 The court refused to imply a "satisfactory perform-
ance" term, noting that to do so would result in the court rewriting
the contract to supply a deficiency.50 Although the court stopped
short of saying that even the presence of such a term would over-
come the at-will presumption, such a contract would seem to be
legally indistinguishable from an agreement not to discharge an
employee "without just cause," which was deemed sufficient to re-
but the at-will presumption in Norfolk Southern Railway v.
Harris.51
42. See Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 163 W. Va. 420, -, 257 S.E.2d 885, 892-93 (W. Va. 1979)
(Neely, J., dissenting).
43. 223 Va. 548, 290 S.E.2d 882 (1982).
44. Id. at 556, 290 S.E.2d at 887.
45. 238 Va. at 177, 380 S.E.2d at 926.
46. 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).
47. 236 Va. 233, 372 S.E.2d 403 (1988).
48. Id. at 235, 372 S.E.2d at 405.
49. Id. at 236, 372 S.E.2d at 405.
50. Id. at 236, 372 S.E.2d at 405 (citing Plaskitt v. Black Diamond Trailer Co., 209 Va.
460, 465, 164 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1968)).
51. 190 Va. 966, 976, 59 S.E.2d 110, 114-15 (1950).
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In Sartin v. Mazur,52 the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
"whether the doctrine permitting free terminability of 'at will' em-
ployment also applies to an offer of such employment." 5 The
plaintiff, in reliance on an offer of employment from the Virginia
Department of Corrections, resigned from her position with the
Veteran's Administration and moved to another part of the state.
When she subsequently was notified that the offer was being with-
drawn because she had omitted certain information from her job
application, 54 she filed suit for breach of contract, relying on Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. O'Neal.5' In Sea-Land, the Supreme Court of
Virginia ruled that an employer's failure to rehire an employee as a
teletype operator-messenger, after she resigned her position as a
sales representative as required by the employer as a condition of
assuming the new position and in reliance on the employer's prom-
ise of reemployment, constituted a breach of contract. 6
The court in Sartin distinguished Sea-Land on two grounds.
First, the court noted that in Sea-Land, the employee resigned
from one position to accept another position with the same em-
ployer.57 Second, the court noted that Sartin's employment with
the Commonwealth was not conditioned upon her resignation from
her prior employment.5 8 Observing that the Department of Correc-
tions had entered into no "contract to exchange jobs" with Ms.
Sartin, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected her reliance on Sea-
Land.59 The court also held that, because the position offered to
Ms. Sartin was terminable at will, the offer itself was also termina-
ble at will. To hold otherwise, the court said, would be "illogical."60
52. 237 Va. 82, 375 S.E.2d 741 (1989).
53. Id. at 83, 375 S.E.2d at 741.
54. The data omitted from her application "related to a one-year period of employment
some 30 years earlier, which had been included in a resume attached to her application." Id.
at 83, 375 S.E.2d at 742.
55. 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647 (1982).
56. Id. at 349, 297 S.E.2d at 650.
57. 237 Va. at 85, 375 S.E.2d at 742.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 85, 375 S.E.2d at 743. Ironically, although the court went on to state that "[iut
would be absurd to require an employer, which had changed its mind after an offer had
been made, to actually employ the applicant for one hour or one day so that the employee
could then be discharged," id. the court in Sea-Land penalized an employer precisely be-
cause it had not followed such a course of conduct. Essentially, in light of Sartin, the theory
of recovery announced in Sea-Land may have effectively been limited to the facts of that
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In its 1985 decision in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,6 1 the
Supreme Court of Virginia recognized a "narrow exception" to the
employment at will doctrine for discharges in violation of public
policy. In a case tried in February 1989 in the Richmond Division
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, an employee prevailed on a wrongful discharge claim based
on the public policy exception. In Gobble v. AT&T Information
Systems, Inc., 2 the employee alleged that a supervisor had tried to
force her to have sex and, when she refused, she received poor
evaluations and eventually was dismissed. The plaintiff's dismissal
for refusing to engage in adultery, which is illegal in Virginia, was
alleged to violate public policy. The court permitted the plaintiff
to go to the jury on this theory and the jury awarded substantial
compensatory and punitive damages. On April 28, 1989, however,
the trial court, noting that the employee had presented only evi-
dence of malice and ill-will on the part of her supervisor and had
not connected that malice and ill-will with the employer, over-
turned the award of punitive damages. 63 In addition, citing an er-
ror in the instructions given to the jury, the court ordered a new
trial on liability. The court concluded that, in order to prevail in
an action for wrongful discharge based upon the public policy ex-
ception, the employee must prove that the employer's decision to
terminate was based solely upon a reason that violated public
policy.6 4
The at-will presumption is inapplicable, of course, where the em-
ployment contract provides that the employment relationship is to
continue for a specified duration. Under such circumstances, the
employer must have cause or otherwise comply with the termina-
tion provisions in the contract in order to terminate the employ-
case.
61. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
62. No. 88-0503-R (E.D. Va. April 28, 1989).
63. Id., slip op. at 5-6.
64. Id., slip op. at 11. In Crescent Horseshoe & Iron Co. v. Eynon, the court held that, to
justify the discharge of an employee, an employer need only prove that the employee
breached an express or implied condition of the employment contract during the term of the
employment relationship and that the employer need not show that such breach was the
inducing motive for the discharge, or even that the employer was aware of the breach at the
time of the discharge. 95 Va. 151, 158, 27 S.E. 935, 936 (1897). Accordingly, a question left
unresolved by the federal district court's adoption of the "sole" cause standard in Gobble is
whether an employer may justify its decision to discharge an employee and thereby defeat
an action under the public policy theory by proving that the employee violated a condition
of the employment agreement, even though such violation did not induce the discharge and
the employer may even have been unaware of the violation at the time of the discharge.
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ment relationship prior to expiration of the term." In Nan Ya
Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. DeSantis,16 a Texas company hired an em-
ployee from a Virginia competitor, but then discharged the em-
ployee after the Virginia company obtained an injunction enforcing
the employee's non-competition agreement. The employee's con-
tract with the Texas company provided for a five-year term. The
employee sued the Texas company for breach of contract. In its
defense, the Texas company argued that the employee had know-
ingly assumed the risk of the injunction, thereby making his em-
ployment with the Texas company "impossible." The Supreme
Court of Virginia, however, rejected this defense, noting that the
Texas company had been well aware of the non-competition agree-
ment when it hired the employee. 7 The Nan Ya court also ruled,
on the issue of damages, that the trial court had properly refused
to provide an offset for amounts the discharged employee "was
likely to earn in the future" on the grounds that such amounts
were "purely speculative.
68
A contract of employment can be written or oral. However, in
recent years, courts applying Virginia law have disagreed on the
applicability of the statute of frauds 69 to an oral employment con-
tract providing for "just cause" dismissal. The issue was first ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Silverman v.
Bernot,70 in which the employer had orally promised his employee
that if she would remain in his employ until she reached age sixty-
two or until his death, whichever occurred first, she would receive a
pension for the rest of her life. Observing first that the crucial in-
quiry under the statute of frauds is whether the contract could be
fully performed on either side within a year from its effective date,
the court held that the contract was not within the statute of
65. See, e.g., Twohy v. Harris, 194 Va. 69, 80, 72 S.E.2d 329, 335-36 (1952).
66. 237 Va. 255, 377 S.E.2d 388 (1989).
67. Id. at 263, 377 S.E.2d at 393.
68. Id. at 263, 377 S.E.2d at 393. In Standard Laundry Serv., Inc. v. Pastelnick, 166 Va.
125, 184 S.E. 193 (1936), the court held that the employer in a wrongful discharge action is
entitled to an offset for "the amount [the employee] has earned or might, by reasonable
effort, have earned in other employment." Id. at 129, 184 S.E. at 195 (emphasis added). The
ability of the employer to offset damages with future earnings will turn on the quality of the
evidence presented by the employer to establish the future earnings.
69. The Virginia Statute of Frauds provides, in pertinent part, that no action shall be
brought "[ulpon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year. . . . [u]nless the
promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance or ratification, or some memoran-
dum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged ... " VA. CODE
ANN. § 11-2(7) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
70. 218 Va. 650, 239 S.E.2d 118 (1977).
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frauds because it could have been performed fully by the em-
ployee, i.e., if the employer had died, within a year after its effec-
tive date.7 1 The court thus distinguished between termination of a
contract by operation of law and completion by performance, and
suggested that the statute of frauds defense might have succeeded
if the contract had provided for the employee to work for the em-
ployer until age sixty-two. 72
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia has not had occasion to
revisit the issue, three separate federal district court decisions, all
arising out of the Eastern District of Virginia, have examined the
applicability of Virginia's statute of frauds to an oral "just cause"
employment contract. In the first of the three decisions, Frazier v.
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation,3 Judge McKenzie held that
the statute did not apply to an oral "just cause" employment con-
tract because such a contract "could be performed within one year
since, for example, [the employee] could have been discharged for
cause within a year of having been hired." 4
Frazier was criticized by the authors of a 1986 law review article,
who stated that the court had failed to observe the distinction
made in Silverman between "termination by operation of law" and
"completion by performance. '75 The authors observed that, if the
employee in Frazier had been discharged for cause within his first
year of employment, neither party would have fully "performed"
the contract; rather, the employee would have breached his prom-
ise to render satisfactory service, thus excusing the employer from
further performance.7 6 Agreeing with the authors, both Judge
Spencer in Haigh v. Matsushita Electric Corp.77 and Judge Ellis in
Windsor v. Aegis Services, Ltd.,7 s subsequently held that an oral
"just cause" employment contract is unenforceable under the stat-
ute of frauds because it cannot be performed fully within a year.79
In a recent per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the
71. Id. at 654, 239 S.E.2d at 121.
72. Id. at 654-55, 239 S.E.2d at 121-22.
73. 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983).
74, Id. at 320.
75. Marshall & Wicker, The Status of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in Virginia, 20
U. RicH. L. REV. 267, 285-86 (1986).
76. Id. at 285-86.
77. 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1987).
78. 691 F. Supp. 956, 958 (E.D. Va. 1988).
79. Citing the "sound reasoning" of Windsor, the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond
recently held that an oral "just cause" contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
Hahn v. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 13 Va. Cir. 335 (City of Richmond 1988).
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Fourth Circuit affirmed and adopted the reasoning of Judge Ellis
in Windsor,s° thus resolving the split of authority in the Eastern
District of Virginia.
IV. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Virginia General Assembly adopted two new provisions dur-
ing its 1989 session which are significant in the employment arena.
First, the General Assembly enacted section 40.1-27.1 of the Code
of Virginia limiting the ability of an employer to discharge an em-
ployee for absence due to a work-related injury."' This provision
declares that it is an unfair employment practice for an employer
who has established an employment policy of discharging employ-
ees who are absent from work for a specified number of days to
include in the computation of the period the employee has been
absent from work any day that the employee is absent due to a
compensable injury under the Worker's Compensation Act.8 2 How-
ever, an employer will not be held in violation of section 40.1-27.1,
if the employee's absence exceeds six months or if the employer's
circumstances have changed during the employee's absence making
it impossible or unreasonable not to discharge such employee.
Second, the General Assembly amended section 40.1-29 of the
Code of Virginia. 3 That section deals with the time and medium
of payment of wages. The General Assembly added a new subsec-
tion,84 subjecting employers who knowingly fail to make payment
of wages in accordance with the provisions of the section 5 to a civil
penalty of up to $1,000.00 for each violation. Such fines are levied
by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry and the decision is
80. Windsor v. Aegis Servs., Ltd., 869 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
81. See 1989 Va. Acts 572.
82. VA. CODE ANN § 65.1-1, to -160 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989). The Code of
Virginia section provides, however, that absences compensable under the Worker's Compen-
sation law can be calculated into an employee's work record for purposes of discharge after
all steps of the "excessive absenteeism" policy have been exhausted. The term "excessive
absenteeism" policy is not defined and presumably refers to a policy adopted by the em-
ployer. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-27.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
83. See 1989 Va. Acts 583.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
85. The section provides, in pertinent part, that all employers operating a business shall
pay salaried employees at least once each month and employees paid on an hourly rate at
least once every two weeks or twice each month. Upon termination of employment, an em-
ployee shall be paid all monies due him for work performed prior thereto, with payment of
such monies to be made on or before the date on which the employee would have been paid
for such work had his employment not been terminated. Id. § 40.1-29(A)(1).
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final."6 -The Commissioner is empowered to prescribe procedures
for the payment of proposed assessments of penalties which are
not contested by employers, including provisions by which an em-
ployer may consent to abatement of the alleged violation and pay a
proposed penalty or negotiated sum in lieu of such penalty without
admission of any civil liability arising from such alleged violation.8 7
Any employer failing to make payment of wages in accordance
with the section is liable for all wages due plus interest at an an-
nual rate of eight percent accruing from the date the wages were
due. 8
86. Civil penalties imposed under the section are paid to the Commissioner for deposit
into the general fund of the State Treasurer. Id. § 40.1-29 (H).
87. Id.
88. Id. § 40.1-29(G).
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